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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FORUM STATE'S USE OF ITS
OWN LONGER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN ITS
ONLY CONTACT WITH THE DISPUTE IS ITS STATUS AS A
FORUM-Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988).
Abstract: In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the United States Supreme Court declared consti-
tutional a forum's use of its own longer statute of limitations. The Court essentially
equates the requirements imposed by the due process clause and the full faith and credit
clause. This Note concludes that the tests for constitutionality advanced by the Court do
not adequately protect the individual rights of litigants, and recommends adopting a new
choice of law test which recognizes both governmental and individual interests.
In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,' the United States Supreme Court held
that Kansas could constitutionally apply its own longer statute of limi-
tations even though the claim would have been time barred in the
states whose substantive law controlled the issues of liability.2 The
majority relied on the characterization of statutes of limitations as pro-
cedural,3 while the concurring justices ("the concurrence") used an
interest analysis.4 The Court focused on the full faith and credit
clause, and gave only slight consideration to the due process clause.5
The Court's limited consideration of the due process clause reflects
an unwarranted assumption that the due process and full faith and
credit clauses require the same analysis in the context of choice of law.
Application of the Court's historical approach may lead to an arbi-
trary and unfair treatment of litigants. Applying the Court's approach
to other issues generally considered to be procedural illustrates the
possible infringement on individual rights. State courts could replace
the traditional substance/procedure dichotomy with an interest analy-
sis that incorporates the interests protected by both the due process
clause and the full faith and credit clause. This interest analysis would
lessen the potential for fundamentally unfair treatment of litigants.
I. CHOICE OF LAW: STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
When a dispute involves contacts with more than one jurisdiction,
the forum court must apply rules to determine what law should gov-
ern the dispute. The rules applied by the forum courts are referred to
as choice of law rules.6
1. 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988).
2. Id. at 2121.
3. Id. at 2121-25.
4. Id. at 2128-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 2121-26.
6. As Professor von Mebren notes:
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A. Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law
States are free to make their own choice of law decisions within
certain constitutional boundaries.7 The two most frequently cited con-
stitutional limits are the full faith and credit clause' and the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 The two clauses serve
different purposes.' 0 The full faith and credit clause focuses on the
interests of states and requires mutual respect between sovereign
states.' t The due process clause, by contrast, focuses on the interests
of individual litigants, and protects those interests by limiting the
power and territorial reach of states.' 2
Although the interests protected by the two clauses are quite differ-
ent, and arguably require different analyses, the Supreme Court has
equated the clauses in the recent decisions of Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts 3 and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague. 14 In Phillips and All-
state, the Court articulated a unitary choice of law test for both the full
faith and credit clause and the due process clause: "[F]or a State's
The choice-of-law problem presents two different, though at times interrelated, questions:
(1) What legal order ultimately controls-or should control-in a situation or transaction
that has significant connections with more than one state; [and] (2) How should a given legal
order regulate a particular multistate situation or transaction?
VON MEHREN, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 928
(1975).
7. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953) ("states are free to adopt such
rules of conflict of laws as they choose,... subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other
constitutional restrictions.").
8. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
9. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Grossman, Statutes of Limitations
and the Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 44 (1979); Martin,
Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 186 (1976). Other
constitutional clauses limiting choice of law are the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, the
privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and the equal protection clause.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see generally Martin, supra, at 185-86.
10. Grossman, supra note 9, at 44; Martin, supra note 9, at 186.
11. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
12. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930).
13. 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985).
14. 449 U.S. 302, 308 & n.10 (1981). In both cases, Justice Stevens argued against equating
the two clauses. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Allstate, Justice Stevens suggested that two
separate questions needed to be answered:
First, does the Full Faith and Credit Clause require Minnesota, the forum State, to apply
Wisconsin law? Second, does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prevent Minnesota from applying its own law? The first inquiry implicates the federal
interest in ensuring that Minnesota respect the sovereignty of the State of Wisconsin; the
second implicates the litigants' interest in a fair adjudication of their rights.
449 U.S. at 320 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner,
that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."15
B. The Substance/Procedure Dichotomy
In making choice of law decisions, courts traditionally have applied
a characterization approach.16 Under the characterization approach,
courts identify issues as either substantive or procedural.17 Matters
dealing with the right are generally considered to be substantive and
are governed by the law of the foreign state.' 8 In contrast, matters
dealing only with the remedy or judicial administration are considered
to be procedural and may be governed by forum law. 9
The forum's application of its own procedural law is justified by the
time and expense that would otherwise be involved in conducting tri-
als that are identical to those of sister states."a The line between sub-
stance and procedure is not always clear.2 Some issues, such as
sufficiency of the pleadings, method of selecting jurors, and selection
of the proper court, fall on the side of judicial administration and
always should be governed by the law of the forum.22 Other issues,
such as burden of proof, burden of production, and sufficiency of the
evidence, fall into a "grey" area between substance and procedure.2 3
A categorical listing of these issues as procedural could infringe upon
15. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added) (quoting Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13). Both
the Allstate and Phillips decisions dealt with the substantive law that was to govern the dispute.
See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between substantive and
procedural law).
16. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 121 (4th ed.
1986) [hereinafter R. LEFLAR]; W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 46 (1984) [hereinafter W. RICHMAN]; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2C (3d ed. 1986); Grossman, supra note 9, at 3-5.
17. R. LEFLAR, supra note 16, § 121; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 16, § 3.2Ci Grossman,
supra note 9, at 3-5.
18. W. RICHMAN, supra note 16, § 46; Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 334-35 (1933).
19. W. RICHMAN, supra note 16, § 46; Cook, supra note 18, 334-35; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 comment a (1969) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
20. See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 16, at 331 ("it would be unthinkable... to have to
set up judicial machinery such as exists in the other legal entity, and operate it in the other state's
fashion").
21. Grossman, supra note 9, at 6.
22. See, eg., R. LEFLAR, supra note 16, at 333-36; RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 122
comment a.
23. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 122 comment a.
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the rights of the individual litigants.24 Some courts have replaced the
traditional characterization approach with an interest analysis
approach that balances the competing interests of the separate states.
C. Procedural Classification of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations traditionally have been characterized as pro-
cedural, and forums have freely applied their own statutes of limita-
tions to disputes.2 6 The Supreme Court has upheld this practice since
the 1800's.2v In Townsend v. Jemison,2 s the Court held the state
court's application of its longer statute of limitations to be constitu-
tional under the full faith and credit clause.29 The Court reasoned
that statutes of limitations affect the remedy, rather than the right.3"
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,31 however, the Supreme Court
left open the question whether application of the forum's longer stat-
ute of limitations violated the due process clause. 32  Recently, three
federal courts of appeals have upheld the constitutionality of a forum
applying its own longer statute of limitations to a dispute with which it
has only minimal contacts. 33  The Third Circuit, however, has held
that such an application violates the due process clause.34
24. Id. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (illustrating some of the substantive
interests inherent in burden of proof, burden of production, and sufficiency of the evidence).
25. See, e.g., Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1975); Heavner v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412, 418 (1973).
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 142; Grossman, supra note 9, at 11-12.
27. See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516-19 (1953); Townsend v.
Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407, 413-20 (1850); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312,
327-28 (1839).
28. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407 (1850).
29. Id. at 413-20.
30. Id. The fourteenth amendment with its due process clause had not yet been adopted
when the Court decided Townsend in 1850.
31. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
32. Id. at 778 n.10. The Court stated:
There has been considerable academic criticism of the rule that permits a forum State to
apply its own statute of limitations regardless of the significance of contacts between the
forum State and the litigation .... But we find it unnecessary to express an opinion at this
time as to whether any arguable unfairness rises to the level of a due process violation.
Id.
33. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 510-14 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2871
(1988); Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 694 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1982); Schreiber v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 794 (10th Cir. 1979).
34. Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423, 425-27 (3d Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2862
(1988) (vacated in light of the Sun Oil decision).
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II. SUN OIL CO. v. WORTMAN
A. Facts and Disposition
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman35 is the culmination of a series of cases
involving a class action suit to recover interest payments on suspended
royalties.36 The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
application of Kansas' longer statute of limitations to allow claims
that were time barred in the states whose substantive law controlled
the liability issues.37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari38 to con-
sider whether the Constitution barred Kansas' application of its own
longer statute of limitations,39 and upheld the Kansas courts'
decision.'
B. The Majority Relied on the Substance/Procedure Dichotomy
The five member majority, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, focused
on whether statutes of limitations may be characterized as substantive
or procedural under the full faith and credit clause. If procedural,
Kansas' application of its own statute of limitations would not violate
the full faith and credit clause because forum states are competent to
legislate procedural matters.4 Relying on the historical classification
of statutes of limitations, the majority held that statutes of limitations
may be considered to be procedural, and therefore, Kansas did not
violate the full faith and credit clause.4" The Court further held that
35. 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988).
36. Under a series of leases, Sun Oil extracted gas from properties in exchange for royalties
from the proceeds of the sale of the gas. Id. at 2120. Sun Oil sold the gas interstate at prices that
included a proposed rate increase. The Federal Power Commission ("FPC") allowed Sun Oil to
collect the increased amount on the condition that Sun Oil would make a refund of any amount
not approved by the FPC. Sun Oil did not include the amount of the rate increase in its royalty
payments until it got approval for the rate increase from the FPC. When Sun Oil made the
suspended royalty payments it failed to include interest on the suspended amounts. The plaintiffs
filed a class action suit in Kansas to compel Sun Oil to pay the interest on the suspended
amounts. An analogous suit against Phillips Petroleum was already in the court system. Id. at
2120-21.
37. Wortman v. Sun Oil Co., 241 Kan. 226, 755 P.2d 488, 493 (1987).
38. 108 S. Ct. 256 (1987).
39. Sun Oil Co, v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988).
40. Id. at 2121.
41. Id. at 2122-25. The majority noted that the full faith and credit clause allows states to
apply their own laws to matters about which they are competent to legislate. States are
competent to legislate about procedural matters, and if statutes of limitations are procedural, a
forum's application of its own statute of limitations does not violate the full faith and credit
clause. Id. at 2122.
42. According to the majority, the framers of the full faith and credit clause expected that it
would be interpreted against the precedents set in international law. Early courts looked to
international law in interpreting the clause. International conflicts law considered statutes of
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the notion of what issues are considered substantive enough to deserve
full faith and credit did not need to be updated by the Court.43 The
Court noted that although certain practices may no longer be consid-
ered wise, they are not necessarily unconstitutional.' If the states no
longer wish to treat a matter as procedural, it is up to those states to
institute change.45
C. The Concurrence Relied on an Interest Analysis
The concurrence, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, argued that the
proper question was not whether statutes of limitations may be consid-
ered procedural for purposes of the full faith and credit clause, but
whether the forum had sufficient interest in the dispute to make appli-
cation of its own law neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.46
The concurrence concluded that the forum, by virtue of being the
forum, had sufficient interest in the dispute to make application of its
own statute of limitations constitutional.47
In reaching this conclusion, the concurrence attempted to balance
three competing governmental interests: First, the procedural interest
in not adjudicating stale claims; second, the substantive interest in the
repose of defendants; and third, the substantive interest in vindicating
injured plaintiffs.48 The concurrence concluded that, on balance of the
limitations to be procedural, and generally governed by forum law. Furthermore, viewing
statutes of limitations as procedural followed analogously from the common law concept of the
right subsisting even though the remedy is withheld. The majority concluded that the historical
record conclusively shows that statutes of limitations may be characterized as procedural. Id. at
2122-23.
43. Id. at 2123-25.
44. Id. at 2125.
45. "If current conditions render it desirable that forum States no longer treat a particular
issue as procedural for conflict of laws purposes, those States can themselves adopt a rule to that
effect." Id.
46. Sun Oil, 108 S. Ct. at 2128-29 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 2129-30.
48. Id. The interest balancing is easiest when the forum's statute of limitations is shorter than
the foreign state's. Id. at 2129. The forum should not be forced to adjudicate stale claims, and
thus, its procedural interest may be seen as stronger than that of the foreign state. Id.
The balancing becomes more difficult when the forum state's statute of limitations is longer
than the foreign state's statute. If both the forum state and the foreign state have an equal
interest in the repose of the defendant, the forum's application of its longer statute of limitations
is fair because the foreign state has no interest in not allowing a right it has created. If, however,
the interests in the repose of the defendant are not equal. an attempt to balance interests may
produce an ambiguous result. The forum's procedural interest in wanting to apply its own
statute of limitations becomes even stronger where there is an ambiguous result. Id. at 2129-30.
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three interests, it was not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair for Kansas
to apply its own longer statute of limitations.49
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS FAILS TO PROTECT THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS
A. The Court Conducted Only a Limited Due Process Clause
Analysis
The majority's reliance on the full faith and credit clause follows
directly from its earlier decisions involving statutes of limitations and
indicates an unwillingness to upset established choice of law prece-
dent."0 The Court has never applied the due process clause in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a forum applying its own longer statute
of limitations. Sun Oil gave the Court an opportunity to answer the
question of constitutionality under the due process clause that it had
left open in Keeton.51 The Court, instead, chose to give the due pro-
cess clause only scant consideration. 2
The Court began its due process analysis by stating that the full
faith and credit cause of action was dependent on the due process
cause of action. 3 The full faith and credit claim could arise only if
the other states were compelled to consider their statutes of limitations
as substantive.54
49. Id. at 2130. In the concurrence's opinion, a thorough balancing of governmental interests
may be difficult and unwieldy. This difficulty gives strength to the forum's procedural interest in
applying its own law, particularly when, as here, the states where the claims arose view their
statutes of limitations as procedural. The concurrence concluded that claims that are at best
arguable do not merit changing over 150 years of precedent holding that it is constitutionally
permissible for the forum to apply its own statute of limitations. Id.
50. See, eg., Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407, 413-20 (1850). In Townsend, the
defendant objected to the forum's application of its own longer statute of limitations to allow a
claim that was time barred in the state of the otherwise applicable law. Id. at 413. The Court
used an historical analysis of statutes of limitations to reject the defendant's claim. Id. at 413-20.
The Court in Sun Oil conducted a similar historical analysis. Sun Oil, at 2121-23; see also Wells
v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516-18 (1953); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
312, 327-28 (1839).
51. See supra note 32 (Court's language leaving the question open).
52. Sun Oil, 108 S. Ct. at 2125-26, 2125 n.3. The majority had already held that the
application of Kansas' longer statute of limitations was constitutional under the full faith and
credit clause even before considering its constitutionality under the due process clause. Id. The
majority noted that it would limit its discussion of the due process clause because most of the
ground had been covered in its discussion of the full faith and credit clause. Id. at 2125 n.3.
The concurrence also gave the due process clause limited attention. The concurrence stated
that the minimum requirements imposed by the two clauses are the same. Id. at 2128 n.2
(Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 2125 n.3.
54. Id.
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The Court's reasoning is circular. First, the Court analyzed statutes
of limitations under the full faith and credit clause to determine if they
are properly categorized as procedural. Second, the Court stated that
the full faith and credit clause is dependent on the due process clause.
Finally, the Court used the previously constitutionally authorized pro-
cedural characterization of statutes of limitations to dismiss the due
process claim as being without merit.
The test for due process in the choice of law context is whether the
state's action is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." As the principal
justification for its due process holding, the majority noted that states
have an interest in determining when a claim is too stale to be adjudi-
cated. 6 The Court may have been trying to establish that Kansas'
decision to apply its own law was not arbitrary. The defendant, how-
ever, was not challenging a state's constitutional right to bar stale
claims. Rather, the defendant was challenging the forum's right to
allow a claim that is time barred in the states whose substantive laws
governed the liability issues. The two questions raise fundamentally
different interests, but the Court failed to make a distinction.5
Under the test of fundamental unfairness the Court focused on
whether the defendant had been unfairly surprised.5 8 The Court con-
cluded that the defendant could not have been surprised because the
rule that a forum applies its own statute of limitations is "as old as the
Republic." 59 Implicitly, the Court concluded that because the prac-
tice essentially had been unchallenged throughout the years, it must be
fair. Yet, just because a practice has been in place for 200 years should
not necessarily make it constitutionally permissible.6"
55. Id. at 2126 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985)); see
supra note 15 and accompanying text (text of Phillips test).
56. Sun Oil, 108 S. Ct. at 2126.
57. Arguably, a court should be able to apply a shorter statute of limitations in order to
conserve judicial resources. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 16, § 121, at 349; R. WEINTRAUB, supra
note 16, § 9.2B, at 538-39; Grossman, supra note 9, at 50. The policy of conserving judicial
resources is inapplicable to the decision to apply a longer statute of limitations. See R. LEFLAR,
supra note 16, at 348-49; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 16, § 9.2B, at 539-40; Grossman, supra
note 9, at 51-52.
58. Sun Oil, 108 S. Ct. at 2126.
59. Id.
60. "That certain choice-of-law practices have so far avoided constitutional scrutiny by this
Court is in any event a poor reason for concluding their constitutional validity." Id. at 2131
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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B. The Court Mistakenly Equated the Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit Clauses
The Court's limited analysis of the due process clause and reliance
on the full faith and credit clause followed from the Court's treatment
of the two clauses in Allstate and Phillips.6 In both cases, the Court
equated the two clauses and stated that the same test would be
required for each.62 Following this logic, the majority could have
relied on either clause for its holding that Kansas' application of its
own statute of limitations was constitutional, and would have reached
the same result.63
By equating the test for the due process clause with that required by
the full faith and credit clause, the Court failed to recognize the differ-
ences in the purposes behind the two clauses.' The due process clause
focuses on the relationship between the individual litigants and the
state.65 In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,66 the Court held that Texas
violated the due process clause by applying its own statute of limita-
tions, instead of the limitations period specified in a Mexican insur-
ance contract.67 The Court determined that the Texas court's
application of its own statute of limitations imposed a greater obliga-
tion on the insurance company than that agreed upon in the insurance
contract. 68 By relying on the due process clause, the Court focused on
the relationship of Texas to the dispute, examining the Texas court's
action in light of fairness to the litigants.
In contrast, the full faith and credit clause focuses on the interests of
the states.6 9 In earlier cases, the Court used an interest analysis which
balanced the competing governmental interests.70 In Alaska Packers
61. For a discussion of Allstate and Phillips see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
62. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 308 & n.10 (1981).
63. In its treatment of the due process clause, the Court noted that "[t]he nub of the present
controversy.., is the scope of constitutionally permissible legislative jurisdiction, and it matters
little whether that is discussed in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as the litigants
have principally done, or in the context of the Due Process Clause." Sun Oil, 108 S. Ct. at 2125
n.3.
64. For a reasoned criticism of the Allstate plurality's equating of the due process clause and
the full faith and credit clause, see Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320-33 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. Grossman, supra note 9, at 44; Martin, supra note 9, at 229.
66. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
67. Id. at 407-10.
68. The court concluded that Texas had no significant relationship with the dispute which
justified varying the terms of the contract. Id. at 408.
69. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Grossman, supra note 9, at 44.
70. See, eg., Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 546-50
(1935); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 157-62 (1932).
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Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,7 the Court affirmed
California's application of its own worker's compensation statute to an
employee who was injured in Alaska.72 The Court stated that the full
faith and credit clause did not automatically compel the use of the
foreign state's statute.73 Rather, the full faith and credit clause
required the court to appraise the governmental interests of each
state.74 The Court held that Alaska's interest was not superior to Cali-
fornia's, so California could constitutionally apply its own law. 5
Relying on the full faith and credit clause, the Court focused on the
competing interests of the states.7 6
Because the interests represented by the two clauses are different,
the clauses require separate analyses for constitutionality. A unitary
test of constitutionality is possible, however, if it recognizes both the
governmental interests and the individual interests involved in the dis-
pute. The test articulated in Allstate and Phillips recognizes govern-
mental interests, but ignores individual interests.7 7 The concurrence
in Sun Oil applied the Allstate and Phillips test literally, and the rights
of the individual litigants, which the due process clause was designed
to protect, got lost in the analysis."
C. Kansas' Application of Its Own Longer Statute of Limitations
Violated the Due Process Clause
A closer examination of the individual interests inherent in a
forum's choice of a statute of limitations should have led the Court to
strike down Kansas' application of its own longer statute of limitations
as unconstitutional. The majority failed to consider the defendant's
substantive right to repose. 79  The contractual limitation in Home
71. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
72. Id. at 550.
73. Id. at 547.
74. Id. "[O]nly if it appears that, in the conflict of interests which have found expression in
the conflicting statutes, the interest of Alaska is superior to that of California, is there rational
basis for denying to the courts of California the right to apply the laws of their own state." Id. at
549.
75. Id. at 550. The court noted that it was unlikely that the employee could successfully
prosecute his claim in Alaska, and he presented a danger of becoming a public charge of
California. Id. at 542.
76. Id. at 546-50. The Court has since abandoned the weighing-of-interest analysis. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (citing Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408
(1955)).
77. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (text of the Allstate and Phillips test).
78. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2128-30 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. The majority's failure to focus on repose may have followed from its holding in Chase
Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945):
750
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Insurance80 and the statutory limitation in Sun Oil are not different in
their effect on the parties' interests.81 The right to sue should be extin-
guished in all forums when the statutes of limitations expire in the
states whose substantive law controls the liability issues. 2
The Sun Oil concurrence considered the repose rights of defendants,
but only in the context of the state's interest in giving individuals
repose.83 A state's interest in repose and a litigant's interest in repose
are quite different. A state desires to protect resident defendants from
suit and to conserve judicial resources by limiting the time available
for claims.84 A defendant, by contrast, needs to be protected from the
possibility of suit after a reasonable period of time because witnesses
may be unavailable and evidence may be lost or destroyed.8" Allowing
a forum state to adjudicate a stale claim forces a defendant to defend
without the resources that would have been available under a more
timely suit. Allowing the plaintiff to bring a claim that would be time
barred in the state whose law controls issues of liability also encour-
ages forum shopping among plaintiffs.86
Sun Oil also was treated unfairly because it could not have antici-
pated that Kansas law would govern the plaintiffs' right to bring the
suit. 7 The parties entered into the leases in Oklahoma, Louisiana,
and Texas; Sun Oil reasonably anticipated that those states' laws
would govern the dispute. Failure to apply those states' limitations
periods frustrated the justifiable expectations of Sun Oil. If the plain-
tiffs had sued in Oklahoma, Louisiana, or Texas, Sun Oil would have
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in
logic.... Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a 'fundamental' right
or what used to be called a 'natural' right of the individual. He may, of course, have the
protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be
good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative
control.
Id. at 314.
However, Chase can be distinguished from Sun Oil because it involved a legislative change in
the limitations period rather than a judicial choice of law decision. Id. at 306-08.
80. For a discussion of Home Insurance, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Conflict of Laws, 19
WASHBURN L.J. 405, 416 (1980).
82. R. LEFLAR, supra note 16, at 349.
83. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2129-30 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
85. Id.
86. For an example of the potential for forum shopping, see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the plaintiff could have brought suit in any jurisdiction
which sold Hustler magazine. Id. at 773. The plaintiff brought suit in New Hampshire which
had an unusually long statute of limitations; the statute of limitations had already run in every
other jurisdiction. Id. at 778.
87. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 327 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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been protected from liability because the claims would have been time
barred. Instead, Sun Oil was unfairly forced to defend against a stale
claim.
Kansas had no state interests which justified the application of its
own statute of limitations. The class-action plaintiffs resided chiefly in
other states, so Kansas was not vindicating the rights of resident plain-
tiffs. Sun Oil was a foreign corporation, so Kansas could not have
been trying to set an example for other in-state corporations. Most
importantly, the Kansas court was further burdening Kansas' court
system by allowing the claim, so it could not have been attempting to
save judicial resources. Because application of the longer statute of
limitations violated the defendant's right to repose and frustrated the
defendant's justifiable expectations, and because there were no state
interests justifying the application, Kansas violated the due process
clause by applying its own longer statute of limitations.
D. Application of the Sun Oil Rationale to Other Issues Generally
Considered to be Procedural
The potential for infringement of individual rights resulting from
the reasoning in the majority and concurring opinions becomes even
more evident when the reasoning is applied to other issues that courts
generally have classified as procedural.88 An analysis of three issues
cited by the majority, burden of proof, burden of production, and suffi-
ciency of the evidence, illustrates the potential inequities that could
occur when applying the rationale of the majority or concurring
opinions.
1. The Majority Is Unlikely To Declare Unconstitutional a Choice
of Law Involving Traditional Procedural Issues
At the end of its full faith and credit analysis, the majority declared
its unwillingness to constitutionalize choice of law decisions.89 It is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which the Court would ever
88. In its conclusion, the majority in Sun Oil stated that "[t]here is no more reason to
consider recharacterizing statutes of limitation as substantive under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause than there is to consider recharacterizing a host of other matters generally treated as
procedural under conflicts law, and hence generally regarded as within the forum State's
legislative jurisdiction." Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-25 (1988). The
majority cited several sections of the Restatement of Conflicts. Id. at 2125.
89. "It is not the function of this Court, however, to make departures from established
choice-of-law precedent and practice constitutionally mandatory." Id.; see also supra note 45
and accompanying text (it is up to states to institute change to characterization inequities).
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declare a choice of law practice to be unconstitutional if it involves
only an issue traditionally characterized as procedural.
The Court relied on the historical characterization of statutes of
limitations in holding constitutional Kansas' application of its own
statute of limitations. 90 Like statutes of limitations, burden of proof,9'
burden of production, 92 and sufficiency of the evidence93 are all issues
which courts have traditionally characterized as procedural.94 Most
courts thus have determined that the forum may apply its own law to
these issues.95 Applying the majority's historical characterization
analysis to these traditionally procedural issues would necessarily lead
to the conclusion that application of forum law on these issues is con-
stitutional. Unfortunately, allowing states almost unlimited freedom
to make choice of law decisions regarding issues traditionally classified
as procedural ignores the substantive elements contained within some
of the traditionally procedural issues.96
2. The Concurrence's Rationale Will Usually Achieve the Same
Result as That Reached by the Majority
The concurrence in Sun Oil used a balancing of interests before con-
cluding that Kansas' application of its own statute of limitations was
constitutional. 97 The concurrence concluded that the forum, by virtue
of being the forum, had sufficient interest in the dispute to make appli-
cation of its own statute of limitations neither arbitrary nor fundamen-
90. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (description of the Court's historical
analysis).
91. Burden of proof refers to the burden of persuading the trier of fact on a particular issue.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 133 comment a.
92. Burden of production refers to the burden of going forward with the evidence; the legal
question of what is sufficient to justify going to the jury on an issue. Presumptions are included
in this category. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 134 comment a.
93. Sufficiency of the evidence refers to the quantum of evidence necessary to justify a finding
in a party's favor. An example of a, rule defining the sufficiency of the evidence is res ipsa
loquitur, where a jury may infer negligence from the occurience of the accident itself. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 135 comments a, b.
94. See, eg., Waite v. Krug Baking Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 382, 136 A.2d 347, 348 (1957)
(burden of proof is procedural); Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 312,
118 P.2d 985, 996 (1941) (presumption is procedural); Nix v. English, 254 N.C. 414, 119 S.E.2d
220, 224 (1961) (sufficiency of evidence is procedural).
95. See, eg., Foley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517, 521 '(1949) (law of
the forum governs burden of proof); Richardson, 11 Wash. 2d at 312, 118 P.2d at 996 (law of the
forum governs presumptions); Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434, 438 (1949)
(law of the forum governs res ipsa loquitur).
96. See, ag., R. LEFLAR, supra note 16, § 124; RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 122 comment
a.
97. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2128-30 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tally unfair.98 Although the concurrence warned against the evils of
an offhanded characterization by the majority of the cited procedural
issues, a closer look at the application of the concurrence's interest
analysis indicates that it usually will reach the same result as that
reached by the majority under the traditional approach.
The concurrence used what is traditionally a choice of law test and
turned it into a constitutional test. When using an interest analysis to
make choice of law decisions, most state courts follow a similar proce-
dure: the court considers the state interests and policies behind the
statutes in question, and then evaluates those interests and policies in
light of the specific facts of the case.99
The concurrence, by contrast, identified what interests might gener-
ally be involved in a statute of limitations choice of law situation. "
After identifying the general policies involved, the concurrence failed
to evaluate those policies in light of the facts of Sun Oil. The concur-
rence, instead, made some general observations about the analysis'
potential weightiness and ambiguity.'0 1 The concurrence probably
used more general terms because it was using the interest analysis test
to determine the constitutionality of a choice of law decision, rather
than making the choice of law decision itself. Nonetheless, state
courts would be hard pressed to find an unconstitutional procedural
classification under this more general type of analysis.'0 2
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1068-72 (9th Cir. 1981); Henry v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32-39 (3d Cir. 1975); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J.
130, 305 A.2d 412, 418 (1973).
100. Sun Oil. 108 S. Ct. at 2129-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. A burden of proof example illustrates the difficulty of applying the concurrence's test.
Consider a case in which state F, the forum, has a contributory negligence rule that requires the
plaintiff to prove freedom from contributory negligence. State X, whose substantive law is being
applied, has a contributory negligence rule that requires the defendant to prove plaintiff's
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense. The concurrence would require a balancing of
the governmental interests involved, such as: First, the forum's strong procedural interest in
applying law with which it is familiar; second, the forum's substantive interest in protecting its
defendants from paying claims for which the plaintiff is at fault; and third, the foreign state's
interest in protecting its citizens so that they do not become dependent on the state.
An attempt to balance these interests is similar to the concurring justices' attempt to balance
the foreign state's interest in the repose of its defendants with the forum state's interest in
vindicating the rights of its plaintiffs. The justices would probably conclude, as they did in the
statute of limitations analysis, that the interest analysis results in potential ambiguity. See supra
notes 48-49 (concurrence's application of its interest analysis test).
When the statute of limitations analysis resulted in ambiguity, the concurrence considered
other factors. First, the concurrence noted that the ambiguity strengthens the forum's interest in
applying its own law. The potential ambiguity which could result from the burden of proof
interest analysis also would strengthen the forum's interest in applying its own law as to burden
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IV. STATES MUST ACT TO PROTECT LITIGANTS
The Sun Oil decision makes clear that the United States Supreme
Court is not likely to hold unconstitutional choice of law practices
involving issues traditionally characterized as procedural. Therefore,
the state courts must shape choice of law rules in a way that protects
the individual rights of litigants.1 °3
A. Toward A New Interests Analysis Choice of Law Rule
The Court in Sun Oil cited Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc.'04 as an exam-
ple of what state courts can do if they decide that use of the procedural
characterization of statutes of limitations is unwise in making choice
of law decisions. 105 In Heavner, the New Jersey Supreme Court aban-
doned the procedural characterization in favor of an interest analy-
sis. 10 6 Heavner represents the great flexibility state courts have in
making and applying choice of law rules. By following the lead given
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Heavner, state courts can apply a
choice of law approach that recognizes interests rather than
formalities.
The current substance/procedure dichotomy may adequately pro-
tect governmental interests but does not adequately protect individual
interests. State courts could adopt a new choice of law rule which
recognizes both the governmental interests protected by the full faith
and credit clause and the individual interests protected by the due pro-
cess clause.10
7
of proof. Second, the concurrence looked at the strength of the precedents allowing the forum to
apply its own statute of limitations. Burden of proof has been characterized consistently as
procedural throughout the century. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (burden of
proof is procedural and governed by forum law). The concurrence probably would declare the
forum's use of its own burden of proof rule to be constitutional.
103. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (it is up to the states to change choice of law
practices). The state courts would not be constitutionally required to take action. They would
be acting to protect the litigants from potentially unfair action.
104. 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973).
105. Sun Oil, 108 S. Ct. at 2125.
106. Heavner, 305 A.2d at 418. Heavner involved a products liability action brought in New
Jersey. The plaintiffs resided in North Carolina, which was also the state where the truck
involved in the accident had been purchased and where the accident occurred. Id. at 414. The
statute of limitations had run in North Carolina, but the Uniform Commercial Code limitation,
adopted in New Jersey, would have allowed the suit in New Jersey. Applying an interest analysis
test, the New Jersey court determined that North Carolina's statute of limitations must be
applied to bar the suit. ia at 418.
107. See supra note 103 (states not constitutionally required to change choice of law
practices).
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The proposed interest analysis involves three steps. First, the court
determines the governmental interests and policies behind the conflict-
ing laws. Second, the court evaluates those policies in light of the facts
of the specific case and makes an initial determination as to which law
should be applied. Finally, if the initial determination indicates that
forum law should be applied, or leads to an uncertain result, the court
considers whether the parties have any individual interests which
might be impinged upon by applying forum law. If so, the court deter-
mines whether the individual interests are strong enough to make
application of forum law unfair. 10 8
B. Application of the New Interest Analysis
To illustrate the results that would flow from a new interest analy-
sis, this section will examine how the interest analysis would apply to
choice of law issues of burden of proof, burden of production, and
sufficiency of the evidence.109
1. Burden of Proof
Consider the following fact situation: 10
H is a resident of Minnesota where he enters into an insurance con-
tract with a Minnesota insurance company to cover his truck. The
contract requires that H give the insurance company timely notice of
an accident in order to recover. H is driving the truck in Wisconsin
when he hits the plaintiff, a Wisconsin resident. Plaintiff brings suit
jointly against H and the insurance company in a Wisconsin court.
The insurance company raises the defense of H's failure to give notice
of the accident. Wisconsin law places the burden of proof on the
insurer as to the defense of no notice. By contrast, Minnesota law
places the burden of proving notice on the insured. The plaintiff, suing
the company directly, is in the same position as the insured. Which
law should the Wisconsin court apply?
The first and second step in an interest analysis, identifying the gov-
ernmental interests and applying those interests to the facts, indicates
108. This analysis is based in part on the relevant inquiries identified by the concurrence in
Allstate. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra
note 14 (Justice Stevens' relevant inquiries).
109. The analysis does not attempt to answer definitively how these issues should be handled
by the courts because each case will depend on the factual background. Instead, the analysis
provides a framework for future application.
110. The facts of this example are based in part on Peterson v. Warren, 31 Wis. 2d 547, 143
N.W.2d 560 (1966), overruled on issues not relevant to this illustration, Allen v. Ross, 38 Wis. 2d
209, 156 N.W.2d 434 (1968).
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that the court could apply either law. Wisconsin may put the burden
on the insurer in an effort to make recovery easier for accident victims,
here a Wisconsin resident. This interest is made stronger because the
accident occurred in Wisconsin. Minnesota may put the burden on
the insured, thus protecting insurance companies and encouraging
insurance business within the state. Minnesota also has a strong inter-
est in having the contract's terms interpreted in accordance with Min-
nesota law because the parties entered into the insurance contract in
Minnesota. Where the burden is placed may affect those terms.
Finally, Wisconsin, as the forum, has a strong procedural interest in
applying familiar law, although this interest may be weakened because
Minnesota's law is easily ascertainable. Because both states have
strong interests in having their own law apply, either law would be
appropriate if the court considered only governmental interests.
The third step in an interest analysis, examining the individual
interests of the defendant, however, shifts the balance in favor of Min-
nesota law. The insurance company entered into the contract in Min-
nesota. The company had every reason to expect that the terms would
be interpreted according to Minnesota law. One of those terms
requires the insured to notify the company of accidents in a timely
fashion. All previous Minnesota decisions have placed the burden on
the insured to prove notice. Switching the burden would frustrate the
defendant's justifiable reliance on Minnesota law. The plaintiff, by
contrast, was not a party to the making of the insurance contract, and
so could not have been unduly surprised by a requirement which
places the burden on him to prove that notice was given to the insur-
ance company. The Wisconsin court, balancing the state and individ-
ual interests, should apply Minnesota's burden of proof law on the
issue of notice.
2. Burden of Production
Consider the following fact situation:11'
An insurance company issues a life insurance policy in South Caro-
lina to a soldier stationed there. No benefit will be paid under the
policy if the insured's death is caused by suicide. The soldier is found
dead in the woods in South Carolina, and circumstances indicate that
he may have committed suicide. The soldier's wife brings suit under
the policy in Alabama, the soldier's legal residence. Alabama law has
a strong presumption that a sane man will not take his own life. South
111. The facts of this example are based in part on Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Boone, 236 F.2d 457
(5th Cir. 1956).
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Carolina law only requires the insurance company to produce credible
evidence of self-destruction. Which law should the Alabama court
apply?
Both states have an interest in having their own burden of produc-
tion law applied. The absence of a strong presumption in South Caro-
lina indicates a protective policy towards insurers. The parties entered
into the contract in South Carolina, and the accident occurred in
South Carolina. South Carolina has strong interests in having its law
applied. Alabama, by having a more stringent presumption, indicates
a protective policy towards beneficiaries. Because the family's legal
residence is Alabama, the state has an interest in protecting the family.
Alabama does not want the family to become a financial burden on the
state. In addition to these substantive interests, Alabama also has a
procedural interest in applying familiar law. The Alabama court
would be justified in choosing its own law if it considered only govern-
mental interests.
A consideration of the individual interests also indicates that the
Alabama court can apply its own law. Although the contract was
entered into in South Carolina, the insurance company was aware that
the soldier's legal residence was Alabama. The insurance company
could have reasonably expected that the insured's widow would bring
suit in Alabama, and thus, could not be unfairly surprised if Alabama
applied its own law. The Alabama court should apply its own
presumption.
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, consider the following fact situation:" 2
A young child resident of Oklahoma is walking by the railroad
tracks in Oklahoma. Later, she is discovered near the train tracks
dead, under circumstances indicating that she has been struck by a
train. Her parents sue the interstate railroad in Arkansas to take
advantage of its more protective laws. Arkansas law allows a res ipsa
loquitur instruction that proof of the accident itself is sufficient for the
jury to infer negligence. Oklahoma law requires actual proof of the
railroad's negligence. Which law should the Arkansas court apply?
Identifying the policies and interests involved as applied to the facts
indicates that, even without consideration of the individual interests,
Oklahoma law should be applied. Arkansas, through its allowance of
res ipsa loquitur, may have a protective policy towards resident acci-
112. The facts of this example are based in part on Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Holmes, 197
Ark. 547, 124 S.W.2d 14 (1939).
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dent victims. However, because the child was a resident of Oklahoma,
that interest is inapplicable. Arkansas may also have a policy interest
in having railroads operate safely when operating within the state. Yet
the accident did not occur in Arkansas, so this interest is also inappli-
cable. Arkansas has a strong procedural interest in applying its own
familiar res ipsa loquitur rule, although the interest is weakened by the
ease of determining Oklahoma law. Oklahoma's lack of a res ipsa
loquitur rule may indicate a protective policy towards railroads, possi-
bly to encourage railroad business within the state. Because the train
was traveling in Oklahoma, Oklahoma has an interest in not having a
res ipsa loquitur instruction given. Arkansas' procedural interest in
applying its own law is not strong enough to overcome Oklahoma's
substantive interest in protecting railroads against accidents where
actual negligence has not been proven. The Arkansas court should
not give a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
Furthermore, an examination of the defendant's individual interest
indicates that applying the law of Arkansas would be potentially
unfair. The effect of the Arkansas instruction is to impose almost
absolute liability on the railroad unless the railroad can overcome the
presumed inference of negligence. If the case had been brought in
Oklahoma, where the accident occurred, the railroad probably would
have been absolved of negligence because the evidence is circumstan-
tial at best. The cause of action would be significantly different if the
court applied Arkansas law. This difference would be potentially
unfair to the railroad. In light of Arkansas' lack of interest in the
dispute and the potential unfairness to the defendant, the Arkansas
court should apply Oklahoma's law on the issue of the sufficiency of
the evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
The full faith and credit clause and the due process clause are not
the same in the context of conflict of laws. Limiting the importance of
the due process clause, or equating the due process clause with the full
faith and credit clause, can result in an unfair treatment of individual
litigants. The treatment of the defendant in Sun Oil illustrates the
potential unfairness which can occur if a forum is allowed to apply its
own longer statute of limitations. The results may be equally, or even
more, unfair if the Court's rationale is applied to other traditionally
procedural issues. Because the Court appears unlikely to declare
unconstitutional established choice of law rules, state courts must take
it upon themselves to institute change.
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Adopting a new choice of law rule which recognizes both govern-
mental and individual interests would protect individual litigants from
potential unfairness. Interest analysis tests are subject to the criticism
of being easy to manipulate and difficult to apply. However, the
potential difficulties in applying the new test are far outweighed by the
importance of protecting the individual rights of litigants. Issues
which relate purely to judicial administration would still be governed
by the forum's own law. Other issues, however, which affect substan-
tive rights, would be decided based on the interests of both the states
and the individuals involved in the dispute.
Janet Kathleen May
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